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Abstract
There has been significant attention paid to explaining and understanding the impact of the UK’s vote to leave the EU onUK
politics and its constitution. There has also been criticism of the political campaigning, from both the “leave” and “remain”
sides, and of people’s understanding of what they were voting for. There has been limited discussion, though, of how to
improve the quality of campaign deliberation, which is fundamental to the legitimacy of both representative and direct
democratic processes. Using the UK’s vote on EU membership as a case study, this article examines the importance of
the law to regulate and improve deliberation prior to direct public votes on specific policy issues. It also considers options
for changes to the law and for its implementation, using the current provisions about false statements in electoral law
as a starting point. The article argues that the quality of deliberation during UK referendum campaigns needs to improve
and that legal regulation should be developed. There are, however, significant challenges in drafting legislation that ap-
propriately defines and limits the use of misleading statements, and at the same time avoids excessive restriction of free
speech, or an excessively political role for regulatory bodies and the courts. Given the nature of political campaigning and
the challenges in reducing the use of misleading statements by political actors through legal regulation, increased delib-
erative opportunities for citizens are proposed as a complementary, perhaps more effective means to positively enhance
deliberation in political campaigns. Whatever approach is taken, direct democracy needs to be combined effectively with
representative democracy, based on a common underlying principle of the importance of deliberation, and not treated as
a separate part of a state’s democracy.
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1. Introduction
The vote on the UK’s EU membership was one of the
most important decisions ever put to the UK electorate.
In a plebiscite1 people were asked a single, seemingly
straightforward question—should the UK remain amem-
ber of the EU or leave the EU? There were active, high-
profile campaigns involving political and non-political ac-
tors, a high turnout by UK standards and a clear, if nar-
row, vote to end the UK’s EU membership. The response
from the electorate, in theory, provided a clear, demo-
cratic mandate on this crucial policy issue; the sort of
legitimate democratic mandate delivered to a political
party every few years at a general election. Despite the
similarities to previous votes, the UK’s EU membership
plebiscite received heavy criticism, particularly with re-
gard to the quality of information, level of debate and
how well-informed voters were (Lamond & Reid, 2017).
The campaigning of both the “leave” and “remain” sides
was criticised for its inaccuracy, tone and weakness in
supporting effective public deliberation, and over half of
voters thought that the campaigningwas not fair and bal-
anced (The Electoral Commission, 2016, p. 7). Despite
the legitimacy of the result being undermined by these
1 The UK’s vote on EU membership was a government-initiated public vote and therefore a plebiscite. The term ‘plebiscite’ is used in this article when
referring specifically to the UK’s EU membership vote and ‘referendums’ as a generic term when talking about plebiscites and referendums in general.
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problems, there has been limited discussion of how to
improve the quality of deliberation and reduce the ma-
nipulation of voters through misleading and inaccurate
information in political campaigning (The Constitution
Unit, 2018).
There was a clear problem with political actors mak-
ing inaccurate and misleading claims during the cam-
paigning prior to the UK’s plebiscite on EU member-
ship. Perhaps, the best-known example from the remain
side was the prediction that each household would be
£4,300worse off (HerMajesty’s Treasury, 2016). This pre-
cise government prediction based on just one possible
future EU–UK relationship was described as “at best a
red herring…an unhelpful summary of the underlying re-
search” (Full Fact, 2016). Another less memorable, but
even more unsound claim was the “demonstrably false”
statement by Alan Johnson that: “Two thirds of British
jobs in manufacturing are dependent on demand from
Europe” (Stone, 2017). On the “leave” side, we had the
controversial prediction that a million Turkish migrants
would come to the UK, if the UK stayed in the EU, and the
false claim that the UKwould save £350million per week,
if it left the EU (Vote Leave, 2016). Should all of these
claims be an illegal practice or are they an accepted part
of free political discourse? The final two claims, which cit-
izens were most likely to remember after the plebiscite
was held, are discussed in more detail below in rela-
tion to this question. Through the lens of the UK’s 2016
plebiscite on EUmembership, therefore, this article looks
at how electoral law and deliberative democratic instru-
mentsmight be used to improve deliberation prior to any
future referendums (Tierney, 2013). With direct democ-
racy apparently here to stay as part of the constitution
in the UK—perhaps another vote on the UK’s EU rela-
tionship or on Scottish independence—and also in other
states across Europe (Qvortrup, 2018; Mendez, Mendez,
& Triga, 2014), such changes are urgently needed.
Access to impartial, accurate information from
trusted sources about the issues related to a decision put
to citizens at a referendum or an election is an essential
aspect of democratic deliberation. Having received this
information, there needs to be well-informed, reasoned
debate and deliberation about the value implications of
the options put to them. As Tierney (2015) said:
If a referendum is to overcome the elite control and
deliberation deficit criticisms it must be shown to of-
fer a meaningful space for an exercise in collective
public reason by citizens who understand an issue, en-
gage with it, and are able to make an informed deci-
sion relatively free from elite-led influences and pres-
sures. (p. 637)
Without this, key democratic principles, such as popular
sovereignty and equality, and criteria for democratic le-
gitimacy, such as effective participation and enlightened
understanding, Dahl (1989) are undermined. Referen-
dums can meet the criteria for democratic legitimacy but
they need careful process design and drafting of the law.
Tierney (2012) This article focuses on increasing the qual-
ity of deliberation during referendum campaigns, which is
one method to limit the opportunity for elite political in-
terests tomanipulate a referendumvote. “Elite control” is
a particular concern for plebiscites because, by definition,
these votes are controlled by the executive (Mendelsohn
& Parkin, 2001). To analyse deliberation within the wider
debate about the legitimacy of referendums, this article
proceeds as follows: First it examines the UK law on false
statements and the scope of its application. Secondly, it
discusses twomisleading statements from the Vote Leave
group in light of electoral law and challenges in framing
an extension to the law. Thirdly, there is discussion of
how an extended electoral law might be implemented
and enforced in practice. Given the difficulties in develop-
ing legal controls of deliberation in the referendum pro-
cess, and that this focus on legislation might not be suffi-
cient (Henderson & Tierney, 2018), the article’s final sec-
tion proposes deliberative methodologies as a comple-
mentary, perhaps more effective means to positively en-
hance deliberation in political campaigns from a citizen
rather than political actor perspective.
The overall argument is that the law needs to change
to act as a stronger deterrent for false statements dur-
ing political campaigning to increase the quality of delib-
eration prior to a public vote, and hence the legitimacy
of the result. There are challenges, though, in drafting
legislation to regulate deliberation in the political envi-
ronment of an electoral or referendum campaign, par-
ticularly if the legal scope were to be increased to in-
clude political statements of the sort that were problem-
atic during the UK’s EU membership plebiscite. A care-
ful balance needs to be struck between political free-
dom and robust campaigning, and the desire to increase
accuracy of information and deliberation during those
campaigns (Rowbottom, 2012). An extension of elec-
toral law also runs the risk of bringing the courts, and
other regulatory bodies, inappropriately in to the polit-
ical arena. Given the limited degree to which the law
can control political actors’ attempted manipulation of
the public discourse, increased use of deliberative instru-
ments, such as citizens’ assemblies, during campaigns
are proposed as a furthermeans to enhance deliberation
and reduce the effect of misleading statements. What-
ever approach is taken to improving the quality of politi-
cal discourse and to having well-informed citizens, refer-
endums need to be combined effectively with represen-
tative democracy, based on a common underlying prin-
ciple of the importance of deliberation to democratic le-
gitimacy, and not regulated or developed as a separate
part of a polity’s democracy.
2. Electoral Law Relating to False Statements
The focus in UK electoral law is on “vote rather than
voice” (LeDuc, 2015, p. 139), on the fairness of the vote it-
self rather than on prior deliberation. The UK has a high
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level of regulation for voting processes (Suiter & Reidy,
2015) but the only legal provision in UK law that directly
influences deliberation is the obligation not tomake false
statements during an election campaign. This has been
an offence since the 19th century, and is now Section 106
of the Representation of the People Act 1983 (RPA). The
Act states:
S106 False statements as to candidates.
(1) A person who, or any director of any body or asso-
ciation corporate which—
(a) before or during an election,
(b) for the purpose of affecting the return of any can-
didate at the election,
makes or publishes any false statement of fact in rela-
tion to the candidate’s personal character or conduct
shall be guilty of an illegal practice, unless he can show
that he had reasonable grounds for believing, and did
believe, that statement to be true. (Parliament of the
United Kingdom, 1983)
If the petition to the election court is upheld and the re-
spondent is found guilty of an illegal practice according
to S106 RPA 1983, then their election shall be void (Parlia-
ment of the United Kingdom, 1983, S159 (1)). The Court
can also restrain a person from repeating false state-
ments by granting an interim injunction. (Parliament of
the United Kingdom, 1983, S106(3)). The law is not appli-
cable to referendums and is limited in scope in relation
to the election of representatives. This is highlighted in
two recent cases: the Phil Woolas case in 2010 and the
Alistair Carmichael case in 2015.
In 2010, during his campaign to be MP for the
Oldham and Saddleworth constituency, Mr Phil Woolas
claimed in a pamphlet and other media that his near-
est rival, Mr Robert Watktins, had attempted to woo the
vote of Muslims who advocated violence, had refused
to condemn extremists who advocated violence against
Mr Woolas, and had reneged on his promise to live in
the constituency. Mr Watkins brought a petition to the
electoral court that these three claims were false state-
ments that contravened S106 RPA (Watkins v. Woolas,
2010). The court upheld MrWatkins petition for the first
two claims: beyond reasonable doubt the statements re-
lating to extremists and violence were false, they related
to the personal conduct or character of Mr Watkins, and
Mr Woolas had no reasonable grounds for believing the
statements were true and did not believe they were true
(R (Woolas v Parliamentary Election Court, 2010). As a re-
sult, the Court declared the election of Mr Woolas void
and he lost his seat in Parliament. The third claim that
Mr Watkins reneged on his promise to live in the con-
stituency was deemed to be a false statement, but not
one that was an illegal practice in contravention of S106
RPA as it was a political matter, rather than one that
spoke to Mr Watkins’ personal character or conduct.
During the general election campaign in 2015, a
memo was leaked that falsely indicated that the Scottish
Nationalist Party leader Nicola Sturgeonwanted the Con-
servative Party leader David Cameron to be re-elected as
Prime Minister. Alistair Carmichael of the Liberal Demo-
crat Party originally denied that he knew anything about
thememo, but following a cabinet inquiry, he was forced
to acknowledge that he had been aware that the memo
was going to be leaked. In effect, he admitted to having
lied during the election campaign. The court agreed that
Mr Carmichael had lied (Timothy Morrison and Others v.
Alistair Carmichael MP, 2015, p. 44–45) but he did not
lose the election petition and did not lose his seat as an
MP. The court stated:
Weare not persuaded that the false statement proved
to have been made was in relation to anything other
than the first respondent’s awareness (or lack of
awareness) of a political machination. Accordingly we
are not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the
words used by the first respondent amounted to a
“false statement of fact in relation to [his] personal
character or conduct. (Timothy Morrison and Others
v. Alistair Carmichael MP, 2015, p. 59)
Carmichael lied but could not be held to account because
the lie fell outside S106 RPA. According to UK law, false
statements that relate to political matters are not imper-
missible during campaigns.
These two cases indicate that existing UK electoral
law, although a useful starting point for discussion of
how to develop laws that might help regulate delibera-
tion, is framed in such away andhas such limited scope in
the UK that it can have almost no impact on referendum
campaigns. An election for a place in Parliament is a con-
test between a limited number of individuals that each
represent a wide-range of policy positions. The charac-
ter and conduct of those individuals is therefore an im-
portant factor in a person’s voting decision. In a referen-
dum, on the other hand, particularly a national one, the
opposite is true: there are usually a wide-ranging num-
ber of people campaigning to support a specific policy
position. This greatly reduces the value of attacking in-
dividuals involved in a referendum campaign, and in the
UK’s recent EU membership plebiscite false statements
tended to be about political positions, such as migration
and public budget issues, rather than personal character
or conduct. Therefore, if legislation is to give the courts
the authority to declare the making of false statements
an illegal practice during referendumcampaigns, it needs
to be extended to include political statements, and not
be restricted to statements relating to “personal charac-
ter or conduct”. This extension could also be applied to
campaigns for the election of representatives. This dis-
tinction between political statements and statements re-
lating to personal character or conduct is not easy to
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draw Hoar (2011), but it would be useful, as Grist (2015)
suggests: “to assess whether this offence [of making a
false statement], and all other relevant offences, prop-
erly cover conduct that a modern electorate considers
should invalidate elections”. For example, does the elec-
torate think Alistair Carmichael should have been cen-
sured for lying, and Woolas also censured for making a
false statement about his rival’s pledge to live in the con-
stituency they were contesting? Although UK law is the
focus for analysis in this article, there is also scope for
comparative research that includes the law relating to
false statements in other parts of the world such as the
US and Australian states.
Freedom of speech during political campaigns is an
important principle and any law regulating statements
made during the course of a political campaign needs
to make sure it does not excessively restrict freedom of
speech and political debate (Rowbottom, 2012). It is ex-
pected that false statements remain as only being regu-
lated in specific contexts, Alexander and Sherwin (2003)
but if the scope for challenging statements is extended,
then freedom of speech must be considered. As Suiter
and Reidy (2015) put it: “In general, the requirement to
regulate referendums is framed in terms of normative as-
sumptions and in particular in terms of regulated equal-
ity versus maximum democratic freedoms”. Space pre-
cludes a full analysis, in relation to freedom of speech,
of the advantages and disadvantages of different ap-
proaches to framing the law relating to false statements
and how it might be implemented in practice. The pre-
sumption here is simply that the more regulation is im-
posed on political campaigning and activity, the greater
there is a chance of restricting freedomof speechbeyond
what is necessary, and that this issue should be carefully
considered before electoral law is reformed.
3. False Statements in the UK Plebiscite and Increasing
the Scope of Electoral Law
The discussion of the scope of false statements contin-
ues by looking at two examples ofmisleading claims from
the UK plebiscite on EUmembership: the “£350million a
week” and “invasion of Turkishmigrants” claims. As both
these claims are political matters and do not relate to
personal character or conduct, there is currently no re-
course in law either to sanction the use of the informa-
tion as presented, or to hold to account those that used
this information to influence the referendum result. As-
suming that there is a need to increase the accuracy and
integrity of statements in political campaigning, the ques-
tion addressed in this section is how electoral law might
define when a misleading political statement is an illegal
practice. Misleading statements are a concern because
they manipulate public debate and have the potential
to unfairly influence people’s voting decisions. Political
campaigning, though, tends to be robust and the line be-
tween accuracy and inaccuracy may often be blurred as
campaigners vie for the best way to present their politi-
cal position. This means that, if the threshold is set too
low, there could be a high number of statements open
to challenge and the freedom of political campaigning
could be excessively restricted. Furthermore, the courts
do not want to be dragged excessively in to arguments of
a political nature (Watkins v. Woolas, 2010, p. 118). On
the other hand, if the threshold for a false statement is
set too high, the lawwill not act as a deterrent to the use
of misleading or inaccurate statements. Next, the article
considers some factors that might be taken in to consid-
eration when deciding whether a misleading statement
is an illegal practice: the extent of the impact on the re-
sult, the regularity of its use, whether it needs to be both
misleading and inaccurate, and deliberately or just negli-
gently used.
The misleading claim that the UK’s EU membership
costs £350 million pounds a week is based on a theo-
retical gross figure of the UK’s financial contribution. Im-
portantly, though, this figure of £350 million does not in-
clude the abatement negotiated in the 1980s, which re-
duced the money sent to the EU in 2016 to £267 million
perweek, and ignores the funds theUK receives from the
EU through, for example, regional development funds,
which further reduced the net contribution to £181 mil-
lion per week in 2016. Office of National Statistics Report
(2017) It is false, therefore, to claim that EUmembership
costs the UK £350million per week and that this amount
could be spent on other public services in the UK, if the
UK left the EU. It is a clear example of amisleading and in-
accurate statement that distorts the quality of the public
debate and limits effective deliberation between citizens,
but should it be an illegal practice according to electoral
law? This claim was a high-profile part of the Leave cam-
paign and was transported around the country on the
side of a bus. It was the most remembered slogan from
the campaign and a significant percentage of people be-
lieved the claim, despite the regular, informal challenges
to its veracity (Ipsos MORI, 2016). Although causality be-
tween any specific campaign slogan and voting decisions
is difficult to prove, the “£350 million a week” claim is
likely therefore to have significantly manipulated voting
decisions. This claim was also an objectively verifiable
claim about current, ongoing practice, not a prediction
whose accuracy or likelihood could be disputed. Finally,
the “£350 million a week” claim was used deliberately
throughout the campaign. It was not a mistakenly at-
tributed figure and there was no defence possible that
those making the claim were unaware it was misleading
or inaccurate. Therefore, even if the law set a relatively
high threshold that required false statements to be re-
peated, objectively verifiable claims that were likely to
have a clear impact on people’s voting preferences, and
also to bemisleading, inaccurate, and deliberately, know-
ingly made, the “£350 million a week” claim is likely to
be deemed a false statement and an illegal practice. Our
second example is not as clear-cut.
The second misleading statement analysed here is
the claim that a wave of Turkish migrants would come to
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the UK, if it stayed in the EU: “we can expect to see an ad-
ditional million people added to the UK population from
Turkey alone within eight years” (Boffey & Helm, 2016).
This scaremongering on its own is difficult to regulate in
law because it is just the expression of an opinion linked
to a possible, if unlikely, political event, and therefore un-
likely to be in scope of a law relating to false statements.
This is a regular part of political campaigning and in gen-
eral it is up to the voter to decide whether they value
this type of persuasion. However, the misleading presen-
tation of the political and legal reality underpinning this
statementmight justify thewider “invasion of Turkishmi-
grants” claim being considered a false statement accord-
ing to electoral law.
A government minister and member of the Vote
Leave campaign group, Penny Mordaunt, stated in a BBC
interview on 22nd May 2016 that Turkish EU member-
ship was imminent and that the UK could not stop this,
even if it was an EU member, as it did not have a veto
over accession decisions (BBC News, 2016). This is mis-
leading for two reasons. First, from a legal perspective
the UK, as an EUMember State, could veto the accession
of Turkey to the EU, if it was proposed, because unan-
imous approval is needed from the Council of the EU.
Penny Mordaunt, therefore, made a misleading and fac-
tually inaccurate statement based on a misunderstand-
ing of the law to support the claim aboutmigration. How-
ever, if we consider the other criteria suggested above,
it seems unlikely that this specific comment would come
within the definition of a false statement. The inaccurate
claim about the UK’s veto is unlikely to have had a signif-
icant impact on voting, as it was a negligent, one-off mis-
take in an interview rather than a deliberately repeated
campaign slogan. Despite being inaccurate and mislead-
ing, this sort of mistake, as long as it does not start to be
repeated, seems difficult to justify as falling within the
scope of legislation that defines false statements, and is
perhaps best dealt with in the interview itself.
Secondly, from the political perspective, although ac-
cession talks are formally alive, the likelihood of Turkish
membership of the EU had receded considerably in the
years prior to the UK’s vote on EU membership. For ex-
ample, Chancellor Angela Merkel stated on 16th March
2016 that Turkey’s bid to join the EU was “really not on
the agenda now” (Lorenz, 2016). Turkish EUmembership
was not likely, therefore, to imminently trigger a wave of
migration of new EU citizens, if the UK did not leave the
EU. Is this sort of misrepresentation of the current politi-
cal reality sufficient to fall within the scope of false state-
ments, according to electoral law? It could be argued that
this is such a clear misreading of a current political posi-
tion that it should be treated as misleading and inaccu-
rate. The “£350 million a week” claim, though, is a mis-
leading and inaccurate presentation of a verifiable fact,
whereas the claim that Turkish accession to the EU is im-
minent is based on amisleading interpretation of the cur-
rent political situation regarding the status of Turkey’s ap-
plication to be an EU member, which could change. The
wider claim of an invasion of Turkish migrants has un-
sound foundations and ismisleading in the sense that it is
very unlikely to occur. However, it is still a prediction that
could occur, if Turkey was granted EU membership, and
the UK chose not to use their veto; however unlikely this
may be. Therefore, despite its potential impact on voting
and its repeated use, this wider “invasion of Turkish mi-
grants” claim is not a verifiable fact that would be likely
to fall within the scope of the definition of a false state-
ment even if it was extended to include statements of a
political character. If this sort of statement were deemed
false, then it would significantly extend the scope of elec-
toral law and substantially lower the threshold at which
a statement becomes an illegal practice. This would re-
quire the regulators and courts to regularly assess politi-
cal matters and could significantly limit free speech dur-
ing political campaigns.
The decision rests with the drafters of any future leg-
islation whether they want to limit the definition of false
statements only to claims, like the £350 million pounds
a week claim, that are verifiable facts, have a significant
impact on voting, and are deliberately repeated despite
being inaccurate and misleading. Or whether, perhaps,
they follow the Advertising Standards Agency’s wider
approach to defining misleading statements. Advertise-
ments are misleading if they are likely to deceive con-
sumers and are likely to cause consumers to take transac-
tional decisions that theywould not otherwise take, even
when they do not include false information (UK Govern-
ment, 2008). This approachwouldmean the second Turk-
ish migrant claim is likely to be misleading enough to
bring it within scope of a law relating to false statements.
The claims discussed show that there is a need to ex-
tend the definition of a false statement as it stands in
UK electoral law to include political statements, not just
statements made about a political rival’s personal char-
acter or conduct. Deciding how to define a false state-
ment in law, though, requires further analysis and there
are a number of difficult issues that need addressing. For
example, where does the burden of proof lie? Should
there be an obligation of truthfulness written in to the
law that would require the personmaking the statement
to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that the state-
ment is not false, as is found in some Australian states?
Does the respondent need to have knowingly made a
false statement? Does manipulation of voting intentions
need to be proved beyond doubt? These questions and
others will need to be addressed when deciding how to
widen the definition of a false statement in political cam-
paigns beyond personal conduct and character.
4. How Should a New Law Be Regulated and Enforced?
In the UK there is no formal process to challenge false
statements during campaigning, or an organisation with
overall responsibility for identifying when statements
are inaccurate and/or misleading. The electoral law on
false statements is applied retrospectively in the election
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court after the election has taken place. The UK Statis-
tics Authority (UKSA), though, has been involved in verify-
ing the accuracy of campaign claims through its statutory
objective of promoting and safeguarding the production
and publication of official statistics that “serve the pub-
lic good”. As a result, during the campaigning, Norman
Lamb MP asked the UKSA to assess the “£350 million
a week” claim against this standard. Sir Andrew Dilnott,
Chair of the UKSA, replied that the claim that leaving the
EU would free up £350 million to spend in the UK on
other priorities, such as theNHS,was potentiallymislead-
ing (UKSA, 2016). The Vote Leave campaign responded
twice to Andrew Dilnott’s letters to challenge the UKSA
explanation of the available statistics; insisting that £350
million a week would be available to spend elsewhere
in the public sector, if the UK left the EU (UKSA, 2016).
This misleading claim has continued to be used since the
plebiscite result despite the UKSA intervention, which is
advisory and not legally enforceable. The current chair-
man of the UKSA wrote to Boris Johnson in September
2017 to rebuke him for continuing to use this figure and
remind him that “It is a clear misuse of official statistics”
(UKSA, 2017). This UKSA experience highlights the politi-
cal nature of the role of evaluating the accuracy of statis-
tics used in campaigns, and also the need for an author-
ity that can robustly examine the use of statistics and en-
force their decisions.
So, how can the law relating to false statements dur-
ing political campaigns be enforced and how can peo-
ple that use misleading statements be held to account?
There are likely to be two phases to the legal evalua-
tion of potentially false statements. First, a formal, non-
judicial opportunity for citizens to query whether a state-
ment is accurate and/or misleading. This is not limited to
statements about personal character or conduct, but it
may perhaps be prudent to limit the non-personal scope
to statements based on statistics or a legal position that
can be objectively assessed. To have an effect on delib-
eration and the quality of public discourse the assess-
ment of the accuracy of campaign statements will need
to be done in a timelymanner to stop the spread ofmisin-
formation, and so that a retraction or correction can be
ordered, where appropriate. A formal, non-judicial pro-
cess should enable swifter, in-campaign resolution of is-
sues of misinformation or misleading statements, which
is preferable to post-event accountability that has no im-
pact on the campaign already run. This should also re-
duce the burden on the courts, which will be reserved
for appeals andmore complex cases. The principle role at
this first stage would therefore be to adjudicate whether
a statement made during the campaign was false, and
perhaps to order corrective action.
A key decision is selecting the independent body
that would adjudicate on whether statements are false.
A number of public bodies could take on this role, such
as the Electoral Commission, which is the UK electoral
regulator, or the Advertising Standards Agency. The Elec-
toral Commission, despite already overseeing and adjudi-
cating on financial and administrative aspects of referen-
dums, have repeatedly stated that they think it inappro-
priate for their role to be extended in to more political
territory that could put their independence at risk (The
Electoral Commission, 2016, p. 7). The Electoral Commis-
sion (2016) states:
The role of regulating the truthfulness of campaign ar-
guments would draw us into political debate and com-
promise the perception of our independence and neu-
trality that is required for our current roles. Thiswould
not be in the best interests of voters or improve public
confidence in the regulatory system. (p. 52)
The Advertising Standards Agency relinquished a role
that included political campaign communications be-
cause of the risk of damage to the perception of its inde-
pendence. This was after the political controversy that
followed its decision to rule against an advert used by
the Conservative party depicting the then Labour leader
Tony Blair with “demon eyes” (McCann, 1997). The deci-
sions of the body that investigates complaints about prac-
tices during political campaigning will be challenged, as
we saw from Vote Leave’s response to the UKSA’s assess-
ment of the “£350 million a week” claim. A new body,
such as an Office of Electoral Integrity might need to be
established. This was already proposed to the Houses of
Parliament as an Early Day Motion in July 2016. Ironi-
cally, one of the proposers was the MP found guilty of
lying, Alistair Carmichael. Alternatively, the politicisation
of the process could be reduced by including citizens in
the decision-making process. A citizens’ jury made up
of a random, representative sample of the population
could be convened for the duration of the campaign pe-
riod as part of the regulatory body charged with oversee-
ing the veracity of campaign claims. Based on the estab-
lished methodologies and good practice of mini-publics
(Gronlund, Bachtiger, & Setala, 2014), this citizens jury
would hear from experts, deliberate and then recom-
mend whether the statement(s) presented to them for
consideration was misleading and inaccurate, and there-
fore a false statement according to the law.Whatever op-
tion is taken, the independence of the regulatory body
will remain an important aspect of its legitimacy and
will need to be managed and defended in the politically
charged atmosphere of a political campaign.
Secondly, the decision-making process would need a
court or tribunal to review the initial decision taken by
the regulatory body as to whether a statement is false,
and to hold further enforcement powers. The petition to
the court, if the law on false statements were extended,
would be for a statement to be voided, rather than the
result of the vote. The sanction imposed in the Woolas
case of voiding the result of the vote is unlikely to be pro-
portionate for referendums. In a general election it is a
singlemember of parliament that loses their seat and the
rerun of the vote in a single constituency is not a large
administrative task. Rerunning a national vote because
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of a false statement is likely to be disproportionate to
the level of offence, unless perhaps where there were a
large number of egregious offences used to manipulate
voters that had a direct, significant and demonstrable im-
pact on the result. As with current election law, the elec-
tion court would likely be able to issue an injunction to
stop statements being used further. They may also need
legal powers to fine organisations that continue to use
statements even after the regulator issues a negative de-
cision. As the main sanctions for false statements will be
fines and injunctions on the use of claims and campaign
slogans, the sooner these decisions can be reached, the
greater the influence on the quality of discourse during
the campaigns. Requiring campaigns to publicly correct
misleading statements, perhaps through leaflets or other
media outlets, could be an effective response as it would
have financial and reputational implications, and could
be swiftly implemented.
There is also the question of personal liability. A fine
would reduce the budget of the campaign group and
their ability to campaign for their preferred outcome and
will act as a deterrent to some degree. Personal liability,
though, is a stronger incentive to stop the use of false
statements during campaigns than an injunction or a fine,
which the campaign group may think is worth the cost.
Furthermore, by the time an injunction is issued, the
false statement may have had the desired effect of ma-
nipulating public opinion, and the campaign group may
be little inconvenienced by the injunction. The option of
personal liability is therefore important if the law is to be
a strong deterrent for false statements.
Holding an individual or individuals to account for
false statements through electoral law is more difficult
for a political campaign prior to a referendum, than it is
for a campaign to elect a political representative. During
the campaign for representative election, the candidate
is easily identifiable as the political actor ultimately re-
sponsible for false statements, and their removal from
office is a direct and proportionate response. During a
referendum campaign to win a policy vote, a campaign
group, rather than an individual, is responsible for deci-
sions about its slogans and statements. Moreover, no in-
dividual will directly benefit politically from using false
statements during a campaign about a policy issue. It
would be possible to require the nomination of a lead
campaigner from each of the official campaign groups
nominated prior to a UK public vote, who would be re-
sponsible for any false statements made. Perhaps this
could be appropriate for a high-profile decision such as
putting the “£350 million a week” claim on the side of
a bus, where authorisation from the campaign group to
use a statement would almost certainly have been given.
However, it is less clear when a “lead campaigner” might
be held responsible for false statements made by cam-
paigners or other politicians. If someone could be held
personally accountable, the question then arises of what
sanction to impose. Should a politician be removed from
their political office for an offence of making false state-
ments during a referendum campaign, and is a fine the
only option for a member of a campaign group who is
not a politician? The question of effective enforcement
and personal liability for false statements during political
campaigning is therefore a difficult one to resolve.
5. Strengthening Citizen Deliberation
Broadening electoral law relating to false statements and
increasing regulatory control, which is the main focus of
this article, will have an impact on deliberation during po-
litical campaigns, but, as the discussion above has high-
lighted, there are significant challenges in drafting leg-
islation that will effectively define and reduce the pro-
liferation of false statements. Even if these challenges
are overcome, misleading statements will only be re-
duced to a limited degree, particularly given the need
to uphold the commitment to free speech. Control of
the campaign discourse will also largely remain with the
main political actors. The legitimacy of election and ref-
erendum campaigns would also benefit, therefore, from
complementing the legal restrictions on false statements
with enhanced opportunities for citizen-focused delib-
eration, which should reduce the impact of misleading
and inaccurate statements more generally. One way to
achieve this is through the application of deliberative
democratic instruments:
The theory and practice of deliberative democracy, in
which great strides have recently been taken in find-
ing new ways in which to engage the popular partic-
ipation of citizens in democratic decision-making, of-
fers a vehicle with which to introduce good practice in
referendums. (Tierney, 2015)
Strengthening the deliberative environment in this way,
for both elections and referendums, should facilitate rea-
soned debate between citizens, allow citizens’ voices to
be heard, and mean that they are better informed at the
point of voting, which addresses one of the most com-
mon criticisms of referendums (Tierney, 2012). It should
also help reduce the current dominance of personality
and party politics (The Electoral Reform Society, 2016).
Increasing reasoned deliberation should reduce the ma-
nipulative effect on voting of false campaign claims and
slogans, and allow amore equal, effective and legitimate
reflection of the popular will when voting for a political
representative or policy (Kildea & Smith, 2016).
Decision-making bodies and researchers across the
world have been experimenting with a wide range of
democratic innovations at all levels of governance for
many years (Smith, 2009). With these innovations in
deliberative democracy well tested now and with key
principles becoming established (Fung, 2007; Gronlund,
Bachtiger, & Setala, 2014), it is time to move from ex-
perimentation to implementation of deliberative democ-
racy in to political systems (Council of Europe, 2018; The
Constitution Unit, 2018; The Electoral Reform Society,
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2016). Events based on mini-public methodologies, such
as citizens assemblies and citizen juries, are perhaps the
most suitable to have the positive influence on politi-
cal campaigning outlined above. Often these have been
stand-alone democratic instruments (Citizens Assembly
for Northern Ireland, 2018; Organ, 2018; Renwick et al.,
2017), but they have also been combined with direct
democratic processes. Perhaps the best-known example
is the Irish citizens’ assembly that was part of the pro-
cess of setting the terms for a referendum on abortion
(Ireland Citizens’ Assembly, 2017). Much of the evidence
from Ireland suggests that citizens’ assemblies can have
a positive effect on wider public discourse during refer-
endum campaigns (The Constitution Unit, 2018, p. 100).
There are, therefore, a range of deliberativemechanisms
with a tested methodology that could be implemented
to enhance deliberation in political campaigning, prior to
both referendum and election votes.
Although these deliberative instruments have been
tested and analysed, and could be implemented, the per-
manent institutionalisation ofmini-publics in democratic
processes is still in its infancy. Europe’s first institutional-
ized deliberative body with annual rotation of randomly
selected participants will be established in Madrid this
year. There are still a number of issues related to delib-
erative democracy, and mini-publics in particular, that
need further examination (Elstub & McLaverty, 2014).
It is unclear exactly how deliberative democratic instru-
ments will fit in to existing governance structures. At
what stage of the referendum process should the citi-
zens’ assembly be held? How would these events inter-
act with other sites of deliberation?What should the out-
come of these events be? More specifically, should the
recommendations from a citizens’ assembly impose obli-
gations, or just be advisory? (Setala, 2006) This would
have to be considered in light of the significant cost of
these events, and the amount of time participants will
have committed. As would the need to ensure that a
citizens’ assembly has impact beyond the relatively lim-
ited number of people that physically participate. Again,
there would need to be a regulatory body responsible
for these deliberative events to oversee their design and
operation and ensure, for example, that interest groups
do not capture their agenda and outcomes. These and
other important questions deserve extensive analysis
once there is further formal, institutionalisation of these
instruments as part of the deliberative process during
election and referendum campaigns. Legal accountabil-
ity for false statements will go some way to enhancing
the deliberation of political actors, but it is also impor-
tant to develop the voice of citizens, particularly given
the challenges to drafting legislation that were discussed
earlier in the article. Citizens’ assemblies, or similar delib-
erative instruments, have the potential to make a signifi-
cant contribution to the quality of deliberation during po-
litical campaigns, but they too face challenges, as these
questions reflect, and will need to be carefully moni-
tored. The next step is for the political establishment to
accept the value of the deliberative role of citizens, and
to have the political will to institutionalise these demo-
cratic instruments and work through any new challenges
that arise during their introduction.
6. Conclusion
It is argued here that the scope of electoral law should
be widened to include the ability to challenge false state-
ments on political issues, and deliberative democracy
should be institutionalised to give citizens formal, proac-
tive opportunities for deliberation during political cam-
paigns. There would be an improvement in the quality
of the deliberative environment through a reduction in
the use of false statements that unfairly manipulate cit-
izens’ voting preferences, and through citizens that are
better placed to filter and interpret statements that are
not misleading enough to fall within the definition of a
false, illegal statement. Reducing political manipulation
and strengthening the quality of citizen deliberation are
important for both representative and direct democratic
processes and their development should reflect common
underlying principles for the democratic systems as a
whole. “Voice” is equally as important in political cam-
paigns for elected representatives as it is for referendums.
All votes in legitimate democratic systems rely on well-
informed voters who have participated in a fair political
campaign. The changes discussed in this article should
increase the democratic legitimacy of the specific cam-
paigns and the democratic system more broadly, and
therefore increase trust in the democratic process and
politicians, whose activities citizens can more effectively
influence and hold to account. In turn, this should lead to
a greater number of “happy losers” in elections and refer-
endums, which will help reduce the type of divisiveness
the UK has seen following its EU membership plebiscite,
and help facilitate the implementation of referendum re-
sults. The changes proposed here are not a magic bul-
let that will resolve all the democratic ills that have been
highlighted by the UK’s recent use of direct democracy,
and the discussion is part of a much wider debate. Fur-
ther issues such as the provision of information, the role
of the media, freedom of speech, the role of Parliament,
and others, would benefit from further, perhaps com-
parative, research. Nevertheless, addressing the issue of
false statements is an important, specific step in thewider
efforts to improve the quality of deliberation in political
campaigns and therefore a state’s democratic legitimacy.
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